stranded:
how states maroon districts in financial distress
This report tells the story of how struggling school districts around the country have been left stranded—financially insecure, with nowhere to turn in a system that leaves them at the mercy of their neighbors. These districts include Midland, Pennsylvania, which had to send its students across state lines to an Ohio school after failing to join with another Pennsylvania district, and Poughkeepsie, New York, whose wealthier neighbor, Spackenkill, defied state recommendations to merge into one, unified district. Other examples span the nation, from Whitmore Lake, Michigan to Wallace, Idaho to Cottonwood, Arizona. In all of these—and in many other instances—districts facing economic distress have sought what most would see as a last resort: to give up on the districts as they are and join their neighbors to form larger, better-resourced school systems. But in nearly all cases, states set these efforts up for failure. Across the country, thirty-nine states allow mergers to proceed only when local districts wish to consolidate, and the incentives in the system dictate that distressed districts will almost always be turned away. And at that point, those districts are left with nowhere else to turn.
Financially troubled districts pursue these mergers because the way American states fund public schools relies heavily on local tax receipts, and district borders define both school systems and property tax jurisdictions. As a result, those borders do a great deal to determine who has access to a well-funded education. In this way, local funding encourages a system of districts that are small and unequal: Wealthy districts are motivated to stay small, keeping revenues in and needy students out. Meanwhile, districts experiencing economic problems, like population declines or loss of local industry, will see their tax bases diminish and will struggle to find sufficient resources within their borders. This self-reinforcing dynamic produces underfunded classrooms and instability for kids, as well as a school system that can’t do the work of powering economic recovery and a better future.
States are failing to take responsibility for stranded students. Only nine states have provisions in law allowing them to merge two school districts, even in the direst of circumstances.
It makes sense, then, that districts facing local economic challenges would seek to join together with a better-off neighbor to broaden the local tax base and break the cycle of economic troubles. But some districts have been trying unsuccessfully to consolidate for upwards of three decades as their neighbors have repeatedly refused to merge. These failures have created long-term insecurity and left students in limbo.
How District Borders Divide Students from Resources
Though funding schools out of property taxes is an approach with a long history, it became a truly entrenched problem over the second half of the twentieth century. That story began in the 1940s, when the state of Texas encouraged wide-scale consolidation of school districts, but left it up to local school boards to decide how and whether to pair up. For years, the students in Edgewood, a poor and largely Mexican-American school district near San Antonio, watched as their wealthier neighbors merged, leaving them behind in more ways than one. By the mid-1950s, Edgewood’s entire property tax base was worth only $2,000 per student, while nearby San Antonio and Alamo Heights both had over $10,000 per student in property value. Edgewood made multiple attempts to join with nearby districts but was repeatedly turned away. Left stranded in a significantly under-resourced school district, the 22,000 students of Edgewood became the plaintiffs in a lawsuit that would eventually become the landmark United States Supreme Court case San Antonio v. Rodriguez (1972).
The lawsuit argued that Texas’s system of partially financing public education through local property taxes deprived the children in low-wealth Edgewood of their right to an equal education. But the Court’s ruling did not bring good news for Edgewood or the millions of children in property-poor districts around the country. The justices agreed that these students were disadvantaged by the system—but found that federal courts have no power to enforce fairness in state school funding systems.
Today, all U.S. public school students live in the world San Antonio has wrought. With the Supreme Court’s approval, states have continued to fund schools substantially out of local property taxes, tying school budgets to local home values. Within the environment created by that policy, affluent families can afford homes in better-off school districts, moving across borders to access well-funded schools and leaving behind school districts that are increasingly concentrated with poor students. In the most egregious cases, funding schools in this way incentivizes wealthy neighborhoods to pull away from the larger community and form their own school districts, drawing new borders that allow them to retain their tax receipts within their hyperlocal communities. And these funding systems also give us school districts that wither on the vine, trapped in borders that outline an unsustainable school system and cannot be changed.
How Students Become Stranded
This kind of school system decline can often begin with local economic troubles. When an area experiences the kind of problems that lead property values to fall—population loss, for instance, or a key employer leaving town—the schools (which are heavily dependent on property tax revenue) will likely suffer too. This sets off a vicious cycle, as difficulties in the school system drive more families to leave the district, accelerating the economic downturn. When the financial burden placed by the school finance system on the struggling community becomes too great, local districts may decide they can no longer go it alone and attempt to merge with a neighboring system so as to share both costs and local resources.
But the same school funding approach that leads such districts to seek a merger also makes it unlikely that any better-off school districts will agree to accept them. From the vantage point of a financially healthy district, such a step could only mean either higher taxes or fewer resources per students when the same tax dollars must stretch further. And while the state could always step in and require districts to consolidate, stretching a lifeline across the border, few states—just nine—have the legal structure in place to do so. Instead, merger decisions are almost always left to the discretion of local boards or voters, making it all but certain that insolvent districts will be left to fend for themselves. This leaves students in limbo, trying to learn in districts that can’t break the cycle of decline.
Case Studies
Policies regarding school funding and district consolidation vary from state to state. But when states employ the most common combination—any form of locally rooted funding, and rules that generally allow districts to choose whether to accept or refuse a merger—some students will always be left stranded in underfunded school systems, no matter what other policies are in place. Click the buttons below to read the stories of districts failed by such state policies in Pennsylvania and New York.
The National Picture
When students are left stranded in struggling districts that are unable to find a consolidation partner, they are victims of school funding policies that are rooted in local property taxes. These policies are a choice: States could choose alternative funding schemes (and, in fact, a few have), eliminating the problems that follow from tying school budgets to local wealth. But as the vast majority of states have chosen this system, with all its attendant inequalities, it is up to those states to deal with the consequences.
If states choose school funding schemes that tie school budgets to local wealth, then they are responsible to deal with the consequences.
Almost no state is taking that responsibility, however. The statistics are clear. Only nine states have provisions in law allowing them to require a merger, even in the direst of circumstances. Meanwhile, thirty-nine states leave merger decisions entirely to the discretion of local school districts. These states span the country, from Alabama to Oregon. Of these, seventeen states not only have voluntary-only consolidation policies; they also offer no incentives at all to encourage mergers. Click the table below to see a full accounting of states with voluntary, mandatory, and incentive-supported consolidation policies.
Today, state funding policies are setting districts up to fail. When economic misfortune comes, as it has come for so many communities over the last decade, our locally rooted funding system sends them into a vicious cycle: Falling tax receipts harm schools, spurring families to leave the community and sending home values and local fortunes into further decline. The same funding policies mean that no better-off district is likely to accept a merger with a struggling school system, and state consolidation policies mean they are almost never asked to. Until states take true responsibility, both for the funding systems they use and the inequities those systems create on the ground, there will be students left stranded.
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After being rejected for merger by all thirteen of its neighbors, Midland was forced to send its students across state lines for school.
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Midland, Pennsylvania has been trying and failing to merge with neighbor districts for close to forty years. In the early 1980s, Midland saw its steel mill (and largest employer) close, leading to a decline in both student enrollment and property values. Foreseeing reduced revenues, the school system approached neighbors in hopes of securing a merger. But Pennsylvania law requires the approval of both local school boards, as well as the State Board of Education, for a merger to take place. Midland’s immediate neighbors were little inclined to take on the struggling district and dilute their richer tax bases. By 1983, the town had sent merger requests to all fourteen other school districts in Beaver County, to no avail.
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Without a consolidation partner, Midland first tried to raise more funds, but was ultimately unable to make the numbers work. Even with tax hikes upwards of 70%, the district was forced to shutter its high school in 1985.
Midland initially secured an agreement to pay nearby Beaver Area High School to enroll its high schoolers. But Midland students, many of whom were nonwhite and from poorer homes, encountered hostility in their new school, and Beaver Area never fully welcomed them. Five years after the agreement was signed, a new Beaver Area school board was elected and ousted the Midland students. With no other local options, the Midland Board of Education looked farther afield for a solution and signed a tuition agreement with the East Liverpool City School District in Ohio. The state of Pennsylvania had so thoroughly abdicated its responsibility to Midland students that they were forced to cross state lines to complete their schooling. This arrangement held for some time, but in 2015, students were again left stranded when the East Liverpool Board of Education voted to end the tuition agreement. Today, Midland students complete high school through a patchwork of charter school options and a smaller, renewed agreement with Beaver Area.
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The recurrent instability wasn’t good for Midland students, and it wasn’t good for the local economy. Median home values declined fast when the crisis began, dropping from $74,000 in 1980 to just $56,000 in 1990 (in today’s dollars). They still haven’t fully recovered, and the gulf in fortunes between Midland and its neighbors remains wide. In 2016, the district’s median house was worth $66,000, compared with $120,000 and $160,000, respectively, in neighbor districts Western Beaver and South Side.
Midland’s forty-year plight is only one example of the many communities throughout Pennsylvania for whom no long-term solution is in sight. Of the eighteen known Pennsylvania school districts that have sought mergers with their neighbors since 2000 (which together enroll almost 29,000 students), all but one have failed. In fact, that one is the only successful district consolidation in Pennsylvania since the 1960s.
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Pennsylvania’s policy on mergers is not unique, however. The vast majority of states (thirty-nine) leave decisions about consolidation entirely up to local school districts. Both school systems involved must generally agree to consolidate, and the state will not step in even when a merger could save a district from insolvency. States with voluntary-only consolidation policies decline to act to break the cycle of economic decline; instead, they choose to let districts sink or swim on their own—with predictably poor results for schools, students, and communities.
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Wealthy enclave Spackenkill has long refused to join with surrounding Poughkeepsie, despite strong state incentives.
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Poughkeepsie, New York has long struggled with economic pressures—ones that are especially stark in comparison to the healthy finances of its neighbor, Spackenkill. When IBM opened a plant in Spackenkill in the early 1940s, it brought new wealth to the community, opening up a disparity between its school district and the urban district of Poughkeepsie next door. By 1960, Spackenkill families had average annual incomes of over 20% more than Poughkeepsie households. Throughout that time, Spackenkill and Poughkeepsie ran separate elementary districts but shared a high school. For decades, the state attempted to pressure Spackenkill to merge completely with Poughkeepsie, which would have closed the resource gap between the schools serving the two towns’ children.
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The state employed both a carrot and a stick. As an incentive, the state offered a five-year, 10% increase in operating funds for the combined district—but Spackenkill wasn’t tempted. And when the wealthier district sought to fully split from Poughkeepsie by building its own high school, the state tried to stop it by refusing to accredit a new school or provide capital funds for its construction. A twenty-five-year battle ensued, including several court cases and contentious public hearings. At one, the son of a Spackenkill minister claimed, “If we build our own high school, all we are doing is creating a middle-class ghetto high school…with the result of leaving Poughkeepsie to rot.” But Spackenkill went ahead with its plans, financing the construction entirely with local funds.
The opening of Spackenkill High in 1973 quashed any remaining hope for a merger. The districts remain separate today, and the gulf between them persists: Poughkeepsie has a student poverty rate over four times as high as its neighbor’s (27% versus 6%) while raising far less revenue per pupil from local sources ($6,118 versus $21,569). Of Poughkeepsie’s 4,500 students, 91% are nonwhite, as opposed to just one-third of those enrolled in Spackenkill.
New York continues to allow districts to decide on their own when and whether to merge, but its financial inducements are now far greater than the aid that failed to sway Spackenkill. The state provides consolidated districts with additional funding equal to 40% of their 2006–07 funding for five years, phasing out over an additional nine years, and a 30% boost in state aid for any construction projects undertaken in the first ten years of the district’s existence. If Poughkeepsie and Spackenkill were to merge today, that policy would give the new district a bonus of $1,200 per student, per year. But even this generous incentive has not produced successful mergers for districts in need: Of forty-four consolidation attempts since 2000, just six have been successful.
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With so much of school funding drawn from local property taxes, wealthy districts have little motivation to stretch their tax bases over more students. This is even true in the twenty-six states that offer some form of financial incentives to encourage district consolidation: As long as they continue to rely on local tax revenues for much of school funding, these incentives have limited effect. Eventually, the extra dollars will phase out, and the wealthier district will be left with less revenue (or higher taxes). New York arguably has the most generous consolidation aid policy of any state, and its failure is the clearest possible proof that these inducements are not enough. The built-in incentives of state funding systems that are rooted in local property tax revenues will always create haves and have-nots, encouraging districts to look out for their own and leave neighboring communities—and their students—to fend for themselves.
State | Voluntary Consolidation Possible | Exclusively Voluntary Consolidation | Incentive Aid for Consolidation | State-Mandated Consolidation |
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Alabama | ||||
Alaska | ||||
Arizona | ||||
Arkansas | ||||
California | ||||
Colorado | ||||
Connecticut | ||||
Delaware | ||||
Florida | ||||
Georgia | ||||
Hawaii | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Idaho | ||||
Illinois | ||||
Indiana | ||||
Iowa | ||||
Kansas | ||||
Kentucky | ||||
Louisiana | ||||
Maine | ||||
Maryland | ||||
Massachusetts | ||||
Michigan | ||||
Minnesota | ||||
Mississippi | ||||
Missouri | ||||
Montana | ||||
Nebraska | ||||
Nevada | ||||
New Hampshire | ||||
New Jersey | ||||
New Mexico | ||||
New York | ||||
North Carolina | ||||
North Dakota | ||||
Ohio | ||||
Oklahoma | ||||
Oregon | ||||
Pennsylvania | ||||
Rhode Island | ||||
South Carolina | ||||
South Dakota | ||||
Tennessee | ||||
Texas | ||||
Utah | ||||
Vermont | ||||
Virginia | ||||
Washington | ||||
West Virginia | ||||
Wisconsin | ||||
Wyoming | ||||
Total | 47 | 39 | 25 | 9 |